Nuclear-powered cruise missiles. Russia is trying to develop a Burevestnik nuclear cruise missile, although its efforts appear to have suffered considerable setbacks. Most importantly, an accident in August 2019, in which five Russian scientists were killed and released from radiation, was the result of a botched operation to recover a missile that had crashed during a test17 The military advantages of nuclear-powered cruise missiles – an effectively unlimited range and capability to penetrate missile defense – are probably quite modest Russia is developing other long-range systems. capable of circumventing missile defence. On the other hand, these weapons entail considerable costs and dangers, including the stress and development difficulties and the significant environmental risks of testing. That`s why these missiles should be banned. This would help Russia assure its European neighbours that they will not be adversely affected by further testing. START`s new terms expire in February 2021, although the contract allows for an extension of up to five years. Russian officials have proposed a debate on an extension. In 2017, trump administration officials said they must first complete the new review of the nuclear position and see if Russia meets the February 2018 limits.
Both boxes were checked more than a year ago. U.S. officials now say they are studying the issue and do not see the haste. The prospects for U.S. nuclear control (500 KO, PDF) IGLBGMs are launched by large missiles, but instead of turning high above the Earth like ICBMs, they quickly return to the atmosphere and then glide forcelessly through at hyper-sound speeds. In 2019, Russia launched the first IGLBGM, Avangard, which is to enter the defense of U.S. missiles and is probably used exclusively with nuclear warheads.11 As its booster is an ICBM in charge of the contract, this missile counts on the borders of New START – but future Russian IGLBGMs should not be. Meanwhile, the United States is focusing on the development of non-nuclear Boost Glide short-range weapons, but has conducted flight tests of intercontinental systems that may not be covered by the borders of New START12.12 Russia is concerned that U.S. IGLBGs, whether nuclear or conventional, could threaten their nuclear forces. Managing these concerns is another reason to limit IGLBGMs. Given the similarities between ICBM and IGLBGMs, there should be few technical challenges in holding IGLBGMs to account as part of a follow-up contract.